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Pragmatic Epistemic Justification and F. Gonseth’s Idoneism 
François Bonsack, Neuchâtel 
What is knowledge ? How can knowledge be distinguished 
from simple opinion or belief ? Are we able to insure 
ourselves against error ? This is the kind of questions that 
Socrates asks the young Theaitetes. During the dialogue, 
several successive definitions are proposed, the last one 
being that knowledge is true belief followed by its justifica-
tion. 
But this characterization leaves many questions unan-
swered. 
1. Can knowledge be grounded on opinion, on belief ? 
Isn't belief subjective, when knowledge is supposed to be 
objective ? Obviousness itself doesn't provides any 
guarantee : it often happened that things that seemed 
obvious to anybody finally turned out to be false. 
2. It is easy to give a sentence the truth value “true”. But 
haven't I often been wrong ? Didn't I often believe that a 
sentence was true when it was false ? What insures that 
an opinion or a belief is true ? What are the criteria of 
truth ? 
3. Is it enough, to protect oneself against error, to re-
quire that knowledge be justified ? Gettier's counter-
example compels us to doubt that. When can a justification 
be considered sufficient ? Isn't justification also liable to 
error or deception ? 
As the Swiss philosopher of science Ferdinand Gonseth 
(1890-1975) properly observes, these attempts to define 
knowledge suffer from a serious flaw : they remain on a 
purely discursive level. They are only words that don't 
properly involve an activity. They lack an essential feature, 
namely the sanction of experience. 
In order to understand what knowledge is, Theaitetes' 
question “What is knowledge” doesn't go far enough. We 
ought to ask a more basic question, namely “What is 
knowledge used for ?” And the answer to that question is 
“Knowledge is used on the one hand to identify the 
circumstances we are in, on the other to determine, as a 
function of this state-of-affairs and the objective to be 
achieved, which decisions should be taken”. 
Can this characterization of the aim of knowledge 
smooth out the difficulties mentioned above ? 
1. It avoids resorting to a subjective belief. Is my knowl-
edge false or true ? It is the efficiency of the action that it 
allows me to guide that will decide : the chance of suc-
ceeding of actions based on good knowledge is better than 
that based on an erroneous estimation of the situation. 
And if one gets control of all factors, one almost certainly 
will succeed.  
2. It assumes the risk of error. All my knowledge isn't 
equally reliable : I consider some data as possible, others 
as probable or as certain. And even knowledge that I 
consider today as certain can be tomorrow be questioned. 
This very thing happened with classical mechanics, whose 
reliability had nevertheless been amply and exactly verified 
during more of a century : it turned out to be inadequate 
for speeds close to that of light and in the microphysical 
domain.. 
As Gonseth says, we have to take decisions in a state of 
informational incompleteness, which means that we will 
sometimes be mistaken. But that does not prevent our 
knowledge to be, in many domains, extremely efficient. 
Knowledge doesn't need to be absolute and definitive to 
be efficient : even summary and partial knowledge can be 
already useful. 
One could say : "You implicitly admit that there is false 
knowledge. Now a false knowledge is not properly a 
knowledge, since it leads to error and isn’t efficient. 
Knowledge has to be necessarily true, otherwise it is not 
knowledge". 
Unfortunately, our knowledge is fallible and we have 
today no means to distinguish between definitively estab-
lished truths – supposing that there are some – and those 
that will be questioned tomorrow. To adopt so rigid a 
position regarding knowledge amounts to making it a 
fictitious notion, inaccessible to the human condition and 
therefore useless. It's wiser to admit that there is, hidden in 
the knowledge that we believe true, part of it that will 
possibly some day appear false.  
3. Putting knowledge in such a pragmatic context nec-
essarily has an impact on the notion of truth. If it is the 
efficiency of prediction that distinguishes a true theory from 
a false one, shouldn't one abandon the notion of truth for a 
weaker one ?  
Gonseth defended a philosophy of knowledge that he 
called idoneism (from Latin idoneus : appropriate, suitable, 
sufficient). The French word idoine can be translated in 
English by adequate and the quality idonéité by fitness or 
adequacy. It is near to what van Fraassen calls empirical 
adequacy. Here the definition that Gonseth gives of it :  
Adequacy is the quality of the statements which, in a 
given situation, fit the circumstances, conditions, de-
mands and means of investigation of the situation best. 
For Gonseth, all knowledge is summary, approximate, 
schematic, revisable, open to future modifications. It is not 
true, it is only adequate. 
What are the differences between adequacy and truth ? 
1. Adequacy leaves some distance between reality and 
the model we build of it. The model is only a framework, it 
retains only the relevant elements for the problem as 
posed.This distance allows a critical attitude : it prevents 
us from taking our approaches for reality itself, or to 
believe that our models exhaust reality. However, it doesn't 
hinder the model from often capturing the main features of 
the real : the fact that the model is adequate presumes 
some structural analogy between it and what it schema-
tizes. 
2. One says : "Truth is one, error multiple". One could 
also say : “Truth is one, adequacy is pluralistic". Depend-
ing on the objective pursued or the required precision, the 
distance we have mentioned allows several different 
models to fit the same reality. During the inquiry, it may 
happen that a model that appeared until now perfectly 
adequate appears insufficient in other circumstances. 
What Gonseth calls a horizon of reality must make room 
for a deeper horizon.  
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2a. This multipicity of models has however to be nu-
anced. The outclassed model shouldn't be thrown away. It 
often remains partially valid, in circumstances where it had 
appeared adequate. Gonseth says that it has been 
"dialectized". 
2b. There are degrees of adequacy : some models are 
more largely, more profoundly or more precisely adequate 
than others. The distance between the model and reality is 
variable.  
2c. We have said that one could change models de-
pending on the objective pursued. But it doesn't therefore 
mean that the same model could not be suitable for 
different purposes. Since the final action consists in 
choosing causes whose effects are the objectives sought, 
causes will not produce different effects because the 
objective has changed. A good knowledge of the relation-
ships between causes and effects can be used for very 
different purposes.  
3. A third and important difference that we have already 
mentioned above is that truth lies on a speculative, purely 
discursive, verbal level while on the contrary adequacy 
relates to the level of experience, of commitment to effi-
cient practice.  
Contrary to a false belief, that can remain unverified, 
inadequacy involves validation by experience: an inade-
quate model can lead to actions that don't achieve their 
purpose, while, by definition, an adequate model allows an 
efficient action. (Which of course doesn't guarantee that 
the desired result would be obtained : one doesn't always 
have the means of one's ambitions.) 
I have said at the beginning that adequacy represents a 
weakening of the notion of truth. But what has been lost in 
discursive affirmation, is gained in operative reliability. One 
exchanges a proud paper truth for a more modest, but 
firmer anchoring in experience and the real. Because what 
is pure knowledge worth that won't guarantee an efficient 
action? And don't we qualify knowledge as true precisely 
because it has allowed and still permits efficient action ? In 
other words : isn't the only reliable and accessible criterion 
of truth of a judgement the practical efficiency that it 
permits, that is to say its adequacy ? 
Here a summary comparison between truth and ade-
quacy : 
 
truth  adequacy 
logically strong logically weakened 
identity 
between model and 
reality 
distance 
between model and reality 
oneness plurality 
absolute degrees of adequacy 
does not depend on 
the purpose 
can depend on the purpose (but 
there are more universal mod-
els) 
purely discursive verified by and anchored in 
experience 
 
Some will tell me : "Adequacy is not enough for me. It's 
truth, that I want, definitive and absolute truth". 
But to require isn't sufficient. One has to have the means 
to realize one's demands. One must choose : either truth, 
but a purely verbal, metaphysical truth, disconnected from 
experience, or adequacy, less ambitious, but verifiable, 
efficient, anchored in experience. In our human condition, 
we sometimes have the means of improving the adequacy 
of our models, but we have no verifiable means to go 
beyond adequacy. And it is adequacy, not truth, that best 
guarantees the reliability of our knowledge. 
 Some people would say, further : "What you say is 
perhaps true for the natural sciences, but in the area of 
logic and mathematics, there are absolute truths". – 
Perhaps, but one must not forget that a pure formalism 
doesn't tell us anything about the world until it has been 
connected to it by correspondence rules. Once again, it is 
necessary to verify what formalism applies to what domain 
in what circumstances. For example, non-euclidean 
geometries are as coherent as euclidean geometry and 
only experience will allow to verify which applies to our 
space and in what conditions. (I know that all of them can 
fit if the curvature of space is weak and the area small 
enough, but non-euclidean geometry with strong curvature 
are not suitable for our space.) 
Gonseth has emphasized this point by describing logic 
as the physics of common objects. He thus stressed the 
pragmatic anchoring of the formalism. To illustrate this 
idea, one can take another example, that of arithmetic. 
The laws of arithmetic are verified only if the elements that 
one manipulates are individualizable and conserved. If the 
elements can break up into several elements, or if they can 
disappear (for example by melting or by sublimating), it 
can happen that three elements and two elements give 
four or six elements. One can therefore say that arithmetic 
is a physics of individualizable and conserved objects.  
 
I thank Perry Proellochs for stimulating discussions on Gettier’s 
problem and Joseph Brenner for his careful correcting of my 
English text. 
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